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I. INTRODUCTION
The incarceration of convicted criminals is an important matter to
law enforcement officials and the public at large. Institutional correc-
tional services consume significant governmental energy and resources.
In 19831 corrections, including jails, prisons, probation, and parole, cost
1. Nineteen eighty-three is the most recent year for which the total cost of corrections is
available from the Bureau of Justice.
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over 10.4 billion dollars.2 In 1985 approximately 503,000 people were
imprisoned in federal and state correctional facilities.' The provision of
prison services must occur on a continuous basis, and space must be
available for every convicted criminal. As certain commentators have
noted, "[o]ne cannot simply let offenders wait in line for an opening."'4
Historically, local, state, and federal government has overseen and
operated our nation's prisons. In operating correctional facilities, public
administrators currently face numerous concerns, including overcrowd-
ing, escalating costs, and increased demand for prison space.5 The con-
tracting of prison services to private companies offers government a
possible solution to these problems. The concept of privatization, how-
ever, is one of the most controversial topics in the field of corrections
today.
Federal and state governments already have taken advantage of the
cost effectiveness offered by private vendors in operating aftercare facil-
ities or supplying specific institutional services.7 In the past, private
companies also have designed and built prison facilities for the govern-
ment to manage. The new element to the current movement proposes
that private companies both build the facilities and oversee their opera-
tion on a contractual, for-profit basis.8
The privatization of corrections is supported by numerous factors,
the most important of which is the private vendor's ability to provide
economically efficient services.9 In addition, private companies, not
2. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, JUSTICE EXPENDITURE AND
EMPLOYMENT, 1983 (July 1986).
3. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, PRISONERS IN 1985 (June
1986). The figure for 1984 was approximately 464,000 people. Id. at 10. The increase from 1984 to
1985 represents the third largest increase in the absolute number of additional inmates since pris-
oner statistics were first collected in 1926. Id. at 1.
4. Travis, Letessa & Vito, Private Enterprise and Institutional Corrections: A Call for Cau-
tion, 49 FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1985, at 11.
5. "The dilemma faced by the public administrator is that jails and prisons have no control
over the size of their populations, the demand for their services, or the standards of operation to
which they will be held by the courts." Id.
6. "Few proposals in the field of corrections have stimulated as sharply divided opinions as
the prospect of contracting with the private sector for the management of prison and jail facili-
ties." Mullen, Corrections and the Private Sector, NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN BRIEF 1
(U.S. Dep't of Justice Ot. 1984).
7. Id.
8. Travis, Latessa & Vito, supra note 4, at 12.
9. Id. at 13. Private vendors have greater market incentive for lowering operating costs and
can utilize a cost-management approach as opposed to the government's budget-administration
approach. Therefore, the same dollar amount will result in either more service or at least better
service. See generally NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PRIVATIZATION OF
CORRECTIONS (1985) [hereinafter PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS] (discussing both the advantages
and disadvantages of involvement by the private sector in the prison industry and some standard
contracting approaches used in currently operating private prison facilities).
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bound by governmental "red tape," possess increased flexibility to re-
spond immediately to needs presented.'0 Moreover, private companies
can offer expertise in design, construction, and management by employ-
ing recognized experts in the field of penal corrections.
The major criticism of privatization is the presence of a hidden cost
in management contracting-the cost of monitoring the private vendors
to ensure that the prisoners are treated in accordance with established
guidelines." Because of the commodity involved, the government must
ensure the precise execution of the contractual covenants, resulting in
additional costs to the actual operation of prison facilities. Moreover,
numerous unresolved legal and political issues present counterargu-
ments to any benefits that privatization might offer. These issues in-
clude: (1) whether a private company's operation and maintenance of a
prison facility constitutes "state action," which would expose the com-
pany to potential liability under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and (2) whether
the government may, under the United States Constitution, delegate
control of a prison facility to a private entity. 2 Thus, numerous unan-
swered questions must be considered if government and a private com-
pany are to contract successfully for private management of
correctional institutions.
This Note addresses only one of the critical issues that government
and a private vendor must consider when planning and contracting for
the private company's services: the effect on the contract if the com-
pany subsequently files for bankruptcy. Important questions include
whether the contract automatically becomes void upon the filing for
bankruptcy, whether the filing for bankruptcy constitutes a breach of
the contract on the part of the private company, and whether the com-
pany may assign its contractual obligations to another company for
subsequent operation. One section of the Bankruptcy Code (Code), sec-
tion 365, sets forth the rights and responsibilities of the parties to an
executory contract and, thus, governs the contracting for prison
services.
This Note explains how section 365 of the Code would operate in
the event of the filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 by a private
company that had contracted to perform correctional services. Part II
sets forth a hypothetical situation, involving a state and a private com-
pany, in order to illustrate the possible consequences of and conflicts in
applying section 365. Part III discusses section 365 and the relevant
10. Mullen, supra note 6, at 6.
11. The contract should provide for frequent on-site inspection programs and renewal proce-
dures to ensure continued performance. Id.




bankruptcy case law interpreting the subsections of 365. Part IV applies
section 365 to the contractual provisions and other facts discussed in
the hypothetical situation. Part V recommends several appropriate con-
tract provisions for avoiding potential problems that may arise out of
bankruptcy. Finally, Part VI highlights several related issues that a
state and private company should consider in negotiating and drafting
a contract for prison services.
II. HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION"3
In the State of Reserve, the Supreme Court of Reserve ordered the
executive branch to cease its practice of overcrowding prison facilities
and improve conditions within the jurisdiction's prison facilities. Re-
serve spent 8.5 million dollars annually in the operation and mainte-
nance of correctional facilities. After careful evaluation, the Reserve
legislature concluded that no additional funds could be budgeted for
the operation of state prisons. The Reserve legislature appointed a com-
mittee to study the alternative of allowing a private vendor to operate
the prisons. Professional organizations provided the committee with in-
formation concerning prison privatization. 4
The Reserve legislature determined that privatization of the state's
correctional facilities would mitigate many of the current problems.
Consequently, Reserve's Correction Commission issued a Request For
Proposal (RFP) to contract for design, construction, and management
of Reserve's correctional facilities. 5 Several companies submitted docu-
ments in accordance with the Commission's request. The Commission
conducted a quantitative and qualitative analysis of these companies,
comparing not only the companies' budget proposals, but also their ex-
perience, service, and operational philosophies. Reserve ultimately
chose Prison Management Incorporated (PMI) to operate the state's
existing prison facilities and to construct additional facilities in the
near future.
13. The company and the situation described in this hypothetical situation are fictitious and
are not intended to represent any existing company or situation. Any similarity to an existing
company is unintentional.
14. For a symposium of scholarly work on the privatization of prison facilities, see Privatiza-
tion and Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REV. 813 (1987).
15. RFPs consist of a private company's proposals for operating the state's corrections facili-
ties. Depending on the extent of the state's needs, this report may include proposals for prison
design, construction, or management, or any combination of the three.
A typical RFP includes the company's incorporation history and other aspects of the company
such as its place of incorporation, the corporate structure, the managements philosophy, the com-
pany's experience in the field, any present facilities the company may be operating, personnel
backgrounds, corporate capital, budgeting plans, proposals for design, construction, and manage-
ment, and perhaps contractual provisions critical to negotiating an agreement. The document may
contain any other characteristics that the company thinks will distinguish it from the competition.
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Subsequently, PMI and Reserve entered into a contract (the Con-
tract), which required PMI to maintain and operate the state's facilities
in accordance with the law and governmental standards. One of PMI's
primary responsibilities was to conduct regular inspections and report
to the contract monitor the dates of the inspections and any problems
discovered. In addition, the Contract required PMI to maintain current
records on all prisoners housed in the facilities and to make these
records available to the official in charge of inmate goodtime awards
and release dates. The Contract provided for a monitor whose responsi-
bilities included checking for compliance with these covenants and
other covenants in the contract.1 6
The Contract also provided for Reserve's duties, including making
monthly payments based on the prisons' costs of operation. The con-
tract monitor employed by the State would evaluate PMI's perform-
ance. The monitor's duties were to protect the prisoners' constitutional
rights and to ensure that PMI complied with all applicable state and
federal laws. In addition, Reserve maintained insurance on the existing
facilities and increased coverage to account for renovations completed
by PMI.
During the contract negotiations, the State stipulated several con-
tract provisions as safeguards against unfortunate future events. The
Contract contained an ipso facto clause 17 allowing either party to termi-
nate the Contract with sixty days' notice to the other party. Termina-
tion could be for any reason, including the insolvency of PMI, the
appointment of a trustee, or the filing of a bankruptcy petition. If ter-
mination occurred, the obligation to operate the prisons would revert
back to the State. In addition, the Contract contained a clause provid-
ing that, in the event of PMI's subsequent insolvency, the Contract
could not be assigned to a third party without the State's consent,
which the State could withhold for any reason. If Reserve prevented an
attempted assignment, all prison operations would revert back to the
State.
PMI operated Reserve's correctional facilities for over two years.
The transition from state to private control went smoothly. Recently,
however, the Reserve Supreme Court ruled that all prison cells must be
no less than twelve feet in length and contain no fewer than four elec-
16. A contract between a government and private company will contain many more provi-
sions than those described in this hypothetical situation. Contracting is the most difficult aspect of
deciding to privatize corrections. Even the most experienced draftsmen may have difficulty plan-
ning for these complex services and anticipating unforeseen circumstances. See generally McEn-
tee, City Services: Can Free Enterprise Outperform the Public Sector?, Bus. & Soc'y REV., Fall
1985, at 43.
17. See infra notes 52-73 and accompanying text.
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trical outlets to operate the television set and clock radio, which are
also required for every cell. PMI failed in the contract negotiations to
foresee the possibility of these changes. The Contract contains no provi-
sion for state assistance for the required alterations. PMI bore the en-
tire financial burden and as a result depleted its capital reserve. After
completing some of the renovations and purchasing most of the televi-
sions, PMI filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
Code. The federal bankruptcy court subsequently appointed a trustee
(the Trustee) to gather PMI's remaining assets for the benefit of PMI's
unsecured creditors.1 8 These events present the issue of what effect
PMI's filing for bankruptcy has on the contract between Reserve and
PMI.
III. OPERATION OF SECTION 365
Three goals are paramount to the design of the Code: 9 (1) provide
the debtor with a fresh start; (2) maximize the value of the debtor's
property; and (3) treat parties with an interest in the property fairly. 0
Section 365, designed to affect these three goals, determines the conse-
quences of a debtor's contractual debts. A "debt" is a liability on a
claim.21 "Claim" is a broad term encompassing rights to payment and
rights to equitable remedies.2 Therefore, if the debtor is bound to a
contract, then the contract represents a claim in bankruptcy belonging
to the party to whom performance is due. 3
Once a Chapter 7 petition is filed, the court appointed trustee must
manage the bankruptcy estate.24 The trustee's duties include the dispo-
sition of executory contracts, which also are considered a part of the
bankruptcy estate.26 In order to protect the debtor, the Code contains
an automatic stay provision that stops, among other things, all collec-
tion efforts, harassment, and foreclosure actions. 2 The automatic stay
18. This Note discusses only the Chapter 7 straight bankruptcy petition. The operation of
§ 365 of the Code, however, also applies to a Chapter 11 business reorganization. Section 365 also
raises many additional, more complex issues apart from a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
19. The Code governs all bankruptcy cases commenced on or after October 1, 1979.
20. Julis, Classifying Rights and Interests Under the Bankruptcy Code, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J.
223 (1981).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1982).
22. Id. § 101(4).
23. Because the Code determines when a contract constitutes a claim in bankruptcy, "if the
debtor is party to a contract on which he is bound to perform the party to whom performance is
due has a claim in bankruptcy if he has a right to payment or an interest in property under the
contract." R. JORDAN & W. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY 819 (1985).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 704(1) (Supp. III 1985).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 362. Section 362(a) operates to stay:
(1) the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial, administrative, or other . . pro-
[Vol. 41:317
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allows the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan or sim-
ply to be relieved of the financial pressures that led to bankruptcy.2 7
A. General Rule in 365(a)
Section 365 is an effort by the Code's drafters to balance the broad
powers needed by the trustee for determining the treatment of execu-
tory contracts against the need to protect the rights and expectations of
those who have contracted with the debtor.2" Putting aside statutory
exceptions, section 365(a) establishes the general rule applicable to ex-
ecutory contracts: the trustee has the right to assume or reject any ex-
ecutory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, subject only to the
court's approval.29 This right is not absolute, and subsequent sections
impose limitations on the trustee's exercise of this broad power.3"
The trustee must evaluate each executory contract for its possible
prospective benefits. Assumption of a contract raises the nondebtor
party from a general unsecured creditor to a first priority administra-
tive expense. 1 Consequently, the trustee must consider carefully
whether the bankruptcy estate, if the contract is assumed, is in a finan-
cial position to accept liability under the contract as a first priority ad-
ministrative expense.32 Under a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the trustee will
assess the value of a contract as a saleable asset to a third party to
determine whether to assume the contract. If the trustee rejects the
contract, the nondebtor party is not without a remedy because rejection
constitutes a breach, enabling the nondebtor to file a claim.33 Filing a
ceeding against the debtor. . .; (2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of
the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title; (3)
any act to obtain possession of property. . .; (4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien
against property of the estate; (5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the
debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commence-
ment of the case under this title; (6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; (7) the set off of any
debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court
concerning the debtor.
Id.
27. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5963, 6296.
28. 2 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 1 365.01, at 365-1 (L. King 3d ed. 1979) [hereinafter
COLLIER].
29. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (Supp. I1 1985). "[Tjhe trustee, subject to the court's approval, may
assume or reject any executory contract. . of the debtor." Id. The scope of § 365 includes both
executory contracts and unexpired leases.
30. Id.
31. R. AARON, BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 9.04[1], at 9-34.1 (1984).
32. See 2 COLLIER, supra note 28, 365.01, at 365-2.
33. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1982) (differentiating between executory contracts
based on the date of assumption and those based on the date of nonassumption).
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claim, however, allows the nondebtor only to share pro rata with other
creditors-sometimes "a very empty right." 4
B. Limitations on the General Rule
Subsections (b), (c), and (d) of section 365 impose limitations on
the trustee's exercise of the broad powers granted in 365(a). Subsection
(b) concerns defaults by the debtor in an executory contract, either
before or after the filing of a petition. If the debtor has defaulted on a
contract, the trustee may not assume the executory contract unless, at
the time of assumption, the trustee has (1) cured the default, or pro-
vided adequate assurance that it will be promptly cured; (2) compen-
sated the nondebtor party for actual pecuniary loss due to the default,
or provided adequate assurance that such compensation is forthcoming;
and (3) provided adequate assurance of future performance under the
contract.35 A default based on an ipso facto or bankruptcy clause whose
operation would terminate the contract automatically or permit a party
to terminate the contract in the event of bankruptcy36 would not consti-
tute a default under this provision.3 7 Subsection (b), however, does not
apply if the debtor is not in default on an executory contract. 8
Subsection (c) imposes further limitations on the trustee's power to
assume or assign a contract. Unless the nondebtor party consents, the
trustee may not assume or assign an executory contract if applicable
nonbankruptcy law excuses the nondebtor party from either accepting
performance or rendering performance to the debtor or an assignee of
the contract. 9 In re Harms40 illustrates how subsection (c) operates.
Arnold C. Harms, the only general partner in a limited partnership,
filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11.41 Based on the fiduciary obliga-
tion among partners, the court held that applicable nonbankruptcy law
prevented the limited partners from having to accept substituted per-
formance from someone with whom the partners were not in privity of
34. 2 D. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 11.11, at 356 (3d ed. 1986).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A)-(C) (Supp. III 1985).
36. See infra notes 52-73 and accompanying text (discussing ipso facto or bankruptcy
clauses).
37. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2) (Supp. III 1985). See generally S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
58, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5844 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
38. Cook & Kelly, The Status of Executory Contracts Under the Bankruptcy Code, 6 AL1/
A.B.A. COURSE MATERIALS J., Apr. 1982, at 7, 11 (citing In re Perretta, 7 Bankr. 103 (Bankr. N.D.
III. 1980)).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) (Supp. III 1985). "This prohibition applies only in the situation in
which applicable law excuses the other party from performance independent of any restrictive
language in the contract. . . ." SENATE REPORT, supra note 37, at 59.
40. 10 Bankr. 817 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981).
41. Id. at 819.
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contract.42 When the court appointed a trustee, the partnership dis-
solved because the trustee was not the party with whom the limited
partners contracted. The trustee in this case was unable to assume the
position of general partner because he was not the person with whom
the limited partners had contracted.43
Section 365(c)(2) imposes an additional limitation on contracts to
borrow funds. The trustee may not assume or assign an executory con-
tract to make a loan or create other debt financing." The legislative
history of subsection (c)(2) indicates that the provision's purpose is to
prevent a party to a transaction that is based on the financial strength
of a debtor from having to extend new credit to the debtor.45 A contract
to provide goods or services with payments over time may be assumed;
a creditor, however, is not required to extend cash to a debtor.46
Subsection (d) imposes a time limitation on the trustee's power to
assume or reject an executory contract. Under a Chapter 7 bankruptcy,
the trustee has sixty days after the order for relief in which to assume
or reject the contract; otherwise, the contract is deemed rejected auto-
matically.4 7 A Chapter 7 bankruptcy involves gathering the debtor's
property into the estate and liquidating the property to satisfy holders
of eligible rights and interests.4 This process effectively ends the com-
mercial life of a debtor. Thus, the automatic rejection provision coin-
cides with the objectives of a Chapter 7 petition by rejecting all
contracts not affirmatively assumed.49 The language of subsection (d)(1)
and the general rule in subsection (a) seem to be contradictory. Under
42. "Under applicable nonbankruptcy law, the limited partners in a limited partnership do
not have to accept substituted performance from a general partner other than the one with whom
they have contracted." Id. at 821.
43. Id.
44. "The trustee may not assume or assign an executory contract. . . of the debtor, whether
or not such contract . . . prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegations of duties, if-
... (2) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or financial
accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor, or to issue a security of the debtor . 11
U.S.C. § 365(c)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
45. SENATE REPORT, supra note 37, at 58-59.
46. 2 COLLIER, supra note 28, T 365.03, at 365-20.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (Supp. III 1985). This subsection permits the court to grant "addi-
tional time" for cause, provided the request is made within the 60-day period. Id. Subsection
(d)(2) establishes the deadlines for bankruptcy petitions filed under Chapter 9, 11, 12 or 13. "[T]he
trustee may assume or reject an executory contract. . .at any time before the confirmation of a
plan but the court, on request of any party to such contract. . ., may order the trustee to deter-
mine within a specified period of time whether to assume or reject such contract. . . ." Id. Subsec-
tion (d) does not indicate whether the court may shorten the time period for assumption or
rejection. One commentator has suggested that the period for assumption or rejection can be short-
ened pursuant to the "all writs" provision of § 105(a) of the Code. See Cook & Kelly, supra note
38, at 21.
48. Julis, supra note 20, at 224.
49. See supra text accompanying note 20.
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the general rule, assumption or rejection is "subject to court ap-
proval";50 under subsection (d)(1), on the other hand, in a Chapter 7
case the executory contract is deemed rejected if not affirmatively as-
sumed within the sixty-day time period. The apparent inconsistency be-
tween these two subsections has been left for the courts to reconcile. 1
C. Invalidation of Bankruptcy Termination Clauses
The Code makes certain bargained-for contractual provisions unen-
forceable. Section 365(e)(1) invalidates ipso facto-bankruptcy clauses
by providing that an executory contract may not be modified or termi-
nated after the commencement of an action in bankruptcy based on the
insolvency or financial condition of the debtor.52 Congress indicated
that the invalidation of ipso facto clauses was necessary to assist the
debtor in either rehabilitation or liquidation cases and to remedy previ-
ous cases that permitted a bankruptcy clause to deprive the estate of a
valuable asset.53 However, in order to assure that the nondebtor re-
ceives the full benefit of its bargain, the advisory committee notes indi-
cate that courts should be sensitive to the invalidation of ipso facto
clauses when invalidation would affect the nondebtor party's rights in
the executory contract.5 4 Subsection (e)(1) overrides state law enforcing
ipso facto clauses;5 5 therefore, even if the state recognizes the legal ef-
fect of these clauses, the Code will prevail. If a party terminates the
contract for a valid reason, other than the reasons listed in section
365(e) (1), 51 then the contractual relationship will end. The Code does
not recognize any remaining assumable interest. 57
Subsection (e)(1) prohibits the termination of a contract "after the
commencement" of the bankruptcy petition "solely" on an ipso facto
50. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
51. 2 COLLIER, supra note 28, 365.02[1], at 365-59.
52. Subsection (e)(1) provides:
[A]n executory contract. . . may not be terminated or modified, and any right or obliga-
tion under such contract. . .may not be terminated or modified, at any time after the
commencement of the case solely because of a provision in such contract . . . that is
conditioned on-
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before the closing of
the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a
custodian before such commencement.
11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1982).
53. SENATE REPORT, supra note 37, at 59.
54. Id.
55. "Subsection (e)(1) also supersedes state law that allows enforcement of such clauses." 2
COLLIER, supra note 28, 365.03, at 365-18 (footnote omitted).
56. See supra note 52.
57. 2 COLLIER, supra note 28, 365.03, at 365-19.
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clause.58 The legislative history indicates that even though a bank-
ruptcy clause cannot control the disposition of an executory contract,
the clause is not entirely invalid.59 Thus, a termination clause may be
exercised prior to the debtor's filing of a petition in bankruptcy even if
the termination is based "solely" on the debtor's insolvency.60 A federal
bankruptcy court in Florida reached this conclusion in In re LJP, Inc. 1
in which the debtor, LJP, Inc., had a bottling contract with the Royal
Crown Cola Company (RCC).2 RCC notified UP, Inc. that RCC was
terminating the agreement pursuant to the termination provision in the
contract.6 3 Thirty days later UP, Inc. filed for bankruptcy and sought
to invalidate the termination under section 365(e) (1).64 Considering the
circumstances of a prepetition notification of termination based on the
debtor's insolvency, the court distinguished the termination of a con-
tract after the commencement of bankruptcy from a prepetition termi-
nation. Whereas section 365(e)(1) expressly prohibits terminations after
a debtor files for bankruptcy, the section does not invalidate termina-
tions prior to filing for bankruptcy.6 5 Consequently, a contract provid-
ing for automatic termination with or without notice to the debtor and
prior to the debtor's filing for bankruptcy results in the debtor having
no protection under the Code because the contract's terms are enforcea-
ble.6 In effect, the courts have created a situation in which a bargained-
for termination right stipulated in a contract can preempt the Code if
triggered at the appropriate time.
Subsection (e)(1) places an additional limitation on the trustee's
power to assign an executory contract. In In re Anne Cara Oil Co.,
Inc.6 7 a bankruptcy court in Massachusetts viewed a valid expiration or
58. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1982).
59. SENATE REPORT, supra note 37, at 59.
60. Ruben, Legislative and Judicial Confusion Concerning Executory Contracts in Bank-
ruptcy, 89 DicK. L. REV. 1029, 1044 (1985).
61. 22 Bankr. 556 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
62. Id. at 557. The contract contained the following termination provision: "This Agreement
and any and all rights of LICENSEE hereunder and any and all obligations of RCC hereunder
shall immediately terminate, without the requirement of notice to LICENSEE, upon the occur-
rence of any of the following: ... (4) The insolvency of LICENSEE; .... ." Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. The Code does not prohibit termination before bankruptcy of a contract because of insol-
vency. Section 365(e)(1) expressly prohibits the termination or modification of any contract "at
any time after the commencement of the case" solely on account of insolvency. 11 U.S.C. §
365(e)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). This subsection also prohibits termination or modification of
any contract solely because of the commencement of a bankruptcy case. The express provisions of
§ 365(e)(1) indicate that the legislature did not intend to invalidate the prepetition termination of
a contract solely on the grounds of insolvency. UP, Inc., 22 Bankr. at 558.
66. Ruben, supra note 60, at 1045.
67. 32 Bankr. 643 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983).
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termination date in an executory contract as a limitation on the
debtor's right to assume and assign the contract in the event a bank-
ruptcy petition is filed. The agreement allowed the creditor to termi-
nate the contract for any one of several reasons after notifying the
debtor."8 The creditor gave notice on both January 12 and March 15
that it would terminate the contract on April 15; subsequently, the
debtor filed for bankruptcy on April 14.69 The debtor, hoping to sus-
pend the termination, sought protection under the automatic stay pro-
vision.70 The court, however, held against the debtor because the
automatic stay does not toll the mere running of time.7 1 Thus, the Code
does not prevent a contract from terminating by its own terms and does
not grant debtors greater powers under a contract than the debtors
have outside of bankruptcy.72 If the trustee assumes a contract, the con-
tract is accompanied by all of its provisions and conditions, including
internal limitations, one of which is the contract's expiration date.73
D. Assignment of the Executory Contract
The value of an executory contract in a Chapter 7 case depends on
the ability of the trustee to sell the contract to a third party and
thereby increase the assets of the bankruptcy estate. Section 365(f) au-
thorizes the trustee to assign an executory contract. 4 Except as pro-
vided in section 365(c),7 5 the trustee may assign an executory contract
notwithstanding a contrary provision in the contract itself or some ap-
plicable law prohibiting, restricting, or conditioning the assignment of
the contract.7" Before an executory contract may be assigned, the trus-
68. Id. at 644.
69. Id. at 645-46.
70. Id. at 646.
71. Id. at 647.
72. Id. The court stated: "The general rule is . . . if the [nondebtor] party had a right to
terminate the arrangement, that right survives adoption of the contract by the trustee. .. " Id.
(citing Thompson v. Texas Mex. Ry., 328 U.S. 134, 141 (1946)).
73. In re Nashville White Trucks, Inc., 5 Bankr. 112, 116 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980).
74. 11 U.S.C. § 365(f) (1982).
75. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
76. Subsection (f) provides:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, notwithstanding a provision in an
executory contract . . . of the debtor, or in applicable law, that prohibits, restricts, or
conditions the assignment of such contract . the trustee may assign such contract
... under paragraph (2) of this subsection.
(2) The trustee may assign an executory contract. . . of the debtor only if-
(A) the trustee assumes such contract .. in accordance with the provisions of this sec-
tion; and
(B) adequate assurance of future performance by the assignee of such contract . . . is
provided, whether or not there has been a default in such contract.
11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1)-(2) (1982).
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tee must assume the contract according to the provisions of subsection
(f), and the assignee must provide adequate assurance of future per-
formance even though no default of the executory contract has
occurred. 77
Subsection (c) provides that an executory contract is not assumable
if applicable law excuses the nondebtor party from accepting perform-
ance or rendering performance to another party.78 Subsection (f), on the
other hand, provides that an executory contract may be assumed if the
requirements of that subsection are followed.7 9 In operation, no conflict
is present between the two subsections. Subsection (f)(1) excepts sub-
section (c), retaining the possibility that applicable law may prevent the
contract's assumption or assignment. The primary function of subsec-
tion (f) is to allow the trustee to assign a contract when a contractual
provision bars such action, even if applicable law in the state recognizes
the legal effect of these provisions.8 0 Moreover, section 365(f)(3) invali-
dates clauses of a contract that terminate or modify the contract if an
assignment takes place." After the trustee assigns the assumed con-
tract, the estate is absolved of liability for any breach of the contract
after the assignment.82
E. Backdating of the Contract if Rejected
In the event that an executory contract is rejected, section 365(g)
sets the date on which the rejection constitutes a breach. If the execu-
tory contract is rejected expressly or by operation of subsection (d)(1),"
the rejection constitutes a breach as of the day immediately preceding
the date on which the petition was filed. 4 Backdating the breach to the
prepetition date classifies the injured party as a general unsecured cred-
77. Id.
78. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (Supp. III 1985). For a general discussion of 365(c), see supra notes 39-
46 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
80. See In re Nitec Paper Corp., 43 Bankr. 492, 498 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
81. SENATE REPORT, supra note 37, at 59. Contract clauses preventing assignment are con-
trary to the policy of § 365(f). Id.
82. 11 U.S.C. § 365(k) (Supp. IH 1985). "Assignment by the trustee to an entity of a contract
or lease assumed under this section relieves the trustee and the estate from any liability for any
breach of such contract or lease occurring after such assignment." Id.
83. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
84. Subsection (g)(1) states: "[T]he rejection of an executory contract. . . of the debtor con-
stitutes a breach of such contract. . . - (1) if such contract. . . has not been assumed under this
section or under a plan confirmed under 9, 11, or 13 of this title, immediately before the date of
the filing of the petition.. . ." 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1) (1982). The remainder of subsection (g) speci-
fies times for different cases that are converted from different chapters in the Code. See SENATE
REPORT, supra note 37, at 60.
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itor.8 5 Without a provision changing the date of the breach, the breach
would occur after the petition was filed so that the injured party's claim
would be classified as an administrative expense.86 Subsection (g)(2)(A)
applies when a contract has been assumed, subsequently rejected, and,
prior to rejection, the case has not been converted from a rehabilitation
case under either Chapter 11 or 13 to a Chapter 7 case. In these special
circumstances, the date of the breach is the time of rejection, and the
injured party's claim is classified as an administrative expense.87
When one party to a contract has gone bankrupt, section 365 at-
tempts to reach an equitable result by balancing the rights of the con-
tracting parties. This section, however, should be carefully considered
by contracting parties not only at the time one party has gone bank-
rupt, but also at the planning and negotiating stages of the contractual
relationship. By understanding section 365, draftsmen can determine
what provisions should be included in a contract in order to reach the
desired result, which provisions ultimately will be given effect, and what
to expect when a trustee in bankruptcy invokes section 365.
IV. APPLICATION OF SECTION 365 TO THE HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION
A. Executory Contract
Because section 365 is triggered only if a contract is executory, the
first issue is whether the Contract in the Hypothetical Situation meets
this criterion. The term "executory contract" is not defined in section
365 or anywhere else in the Code. According to the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws, the lack of a clear definition was intentional; more
precise statutory language might have altered the well understood
meaning of "executory contract" by an unintended omission or inclu-
sion. 8 The legislative history of section 365 provides some guidance by
characterizing executory contracts as "contracts on which performance
remains due to some extent on both sides."89 On the other hand, several
federal courts of appeals recognize Professor Vern Countryman's defini-
tion of executory contract:90 "[A] contract under which the obligation of
both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unper-
formed that the failure of either to complete performance would consti-
85. 2 D. COWANS, supra note 34, at 374.
86. Id.
87. 2 COLLIER, supra note 28, 1 365.05, at 365-24. An administrative expense is a secured
expense that will be paid over an unsecured expense.
88. COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO CONGRESS, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 198, 199 (1973).
89. SENATE REPORT, supra note 37, at 58.
90. See Cook & Kelly, supra note 38, at 9 (listing the appellate and bankruptcy courts that
have adopted Professor Countryman's definition of executory contract).
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tute a material breach excusing the performance of the other." 91
If the Contract is not deemed executory, section 365 will not apply;
consequently, the Contract would be breached because it is nonassum-
able by the estate.2 The impact of the breach on the parties to the
Contract depends on how the court applies the Code and relevant
nonbankruptcy law.9 3 If the court does not consider the breach "mate-
rial" under nonbankruptcy law, Reserve would be obligated to perform
the remaining obligations of the Contract for the benefit of the bank-
ruptcy estate. The State would be left with a right to damages through
a pre-petition claim under section 101(4). 4 However, if the court does
characterize the breach as material under nonbankruptcy law, Reserve
would be relieved of rendering further performance and would have to
join the other unsecured creditors waiting for the distribution of the
estate.9 5
The contractual provisions described in the hypothetical are suffi-
cient to support a finding that the Contract is executory. PMI must
conduct regular inspections of the facilities and file a report with Re-
serve detailing the results of the inspections. Reserve also must make
regular payments and maintain a contract monitor in order to review
PMI's performance under the Contract. Thus, performance remains due
on both sides throughout the life of the Contract.98 When filing for
bankruptcy, the Contract must be executory; however, if any part of the
Contract remains unperformed, the whole Contract is executory.97 Once
the court determines that the Contract is executory, the parties must
Work within the parameters of section 365 and its limitations in order
to determine the parties' rights.
B. Time Period for Rejection or Assumption
Assuming the Contract is executory, the general rule of section 365
applies. Thus, the Trustee may reject, assume, or assign the Contract.
The next issue is whether the State may prevent the Trustee from re-
91. Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 460
(1973).





96. Whether the contract is executory is a factor the parties should take into consideration at
the drafting stage. The focus should be on which result-a determination of executory or not exec-
utory-would yield the desired outcome. See generally id. (challenging the Countryman definition
and proposing an outcome determinative analysis for evaluating whether a contract is executory).
97. See In re Universal Medical Serv., Inc. 325 F. Supp. 890, 891 (E.D. Pa. 1971), af'd, 460
F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1972).
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jecting the Contract. Section 365 makes rejection of an executory con-
tract subject to court approval. PMI, however, has filed a Chapter 7
petition for bankruptcy. Section 365(d)(1) provides that in liquidation
cases a contract automatically terminates after sixty days if it is not
assumed.98 Reserve cannot prevent the passing of time; therefore, rejec-
tion can occur without court approval. 9 If rejection does occur, then
the consequences would be similar to an ordinary breach. Reserve
would be left only with the prospect of money damages.10
C. Ipso Facto Termination Clause
A third issue arises when Reserve attempts to terminate the Con-
tract based on PMI's filing of a bankruptcy petition. Reserve has bar-
gained for the right to terminate the Contract upon PMI's insolvency,
bankruptcy, or other specified events. The termination clause comes
within the explicit language of section 365(e)(1), which prevents Re-
serve from terminating the Contract because of bankruptcy. Subsection
(e) (1) prohibits post-petition termination of the Contract based "solely"
on bankruptcy. But what if, after the filing for bankruptcy, other fac-
tors present grounds for invoking the termination clause under the
"other specified events" clause of the Contract? According to one com-
mentator, the language in this subsection suggests that the Code's
draftsmen intended to allow automatic termination if other factors
outside the termination provision are present.101 These "other factors"
will come under close scrutiny because courts generally are reluctant to
sanction the termination of a valuable asset based on a bankruptcy
clause.102
The court in In re Nashville White Trucks, Inc.10 3 followed the
above reasoning. The debtor was routinely late with lease payments,
98. See generally supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
99. The operation of subsections (a) and (d) together implies that the "subject to" language
in subsection (a) is limited to situations involving Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 when rehabilitation is
the overriding emphasis.
100. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. The operation of subsection (d)(1) also
leaves open a window of 60 days during which Reserve may have to wait for the Trustee's decision.
This interim waiting period for a determination by PM! raises a number of questions: What hap-
pens to the prison's operations in the interim? Are the prisoners still fed and guarded? Does PMI
have to perform any duties under the Contract? Can PMI force Reserve back into the business of
corrections even though the Contract required notice 60 days prior to termination? What happens
if PMI promptly seeks court approval to reject the Contract-should it be granted? What happens
after rejection? Before privatization of corrections facilities expands even more, the Code and
nonbankruptcy law should address these unique concerns presented by the privatization of
corrections.
101. Ruben, supra note 60, at 1043.
102. 2 COLLIER, supra note 28, 1 365.02, at 365-6.
103. 5 Bankr. 112 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980).
332 [Vol. 41:317
PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS
delinquent in open account payments, late with monthly financial state-
ments, and below working capital requirements. 104 The federal bank-
ruptcy court in Tennessee permitted post-petition termination because
bankruptcy was not the cause of termination, but merely the event that
triggered a final decision. 05 The court, however, did not indicate
whether bankruptcy was included among the "numerous other factors"
or whether the other factors alone supported the termination. 0 6
Reserve, therefore, may be able to utilize the Contract's termina-
tion clause if the court follows the negative inference of section
365(e)(1) and allows termination based on "other factors." This clause
will be effective if the draftsmen did not trigger termination "solely" on
the basis of bankruptcy. Reserve might also terminate the Contract by
invoking the termination clause prior to the filing for bankruptcy based
on PMI's insolvency. Subsection (e)(1) invalidates ipso facto clauses
only after bankruptcy is filed. Thus, an ipso facto clause provides Re-
serve with two methods of terminating the Contract in the event of
PMI's bankruptcy.
D. Termination-at-Will Clause
A termination-at-will clause, not covered by the Code, may avoid
the effect of section 365.107 Under such a termination provision, termi-
nation is not conditioned on bankruptcy. Section 365(e)(1), therefore, is
not applicable. When faced with a termination-at-will clause, courts ei-
ther will enforce and honor the expectations of the parties or strike
down the clause by asserting general principles of bankruptcy law.'08
Several courts have faced termination-at-will clauses in circum-
stances in which a prepetition notice of termination resulted in the ter-
mination occurring after the filing of the petition.' These cases
generally involve a termination notice given by the nondebtor prior to
the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The notice includes a specified date
on which the contract will terminate according to its own terms. Before
that date, however, the other party usually files a bankruptcy petition,
hoping that the automatic stay will prevent the contract from lapsing so
104. Id. at 114.
105. Id. at 117.
106. Ruben, supra note 60, at 1044.
107. The following is an example of a termination-at-will clause: "either party may terminate
this contract upon thirty days written notice." Id. at 1045 n.88.
108. Id. at 1046.
109. Schokbeton Indus., Inc. v. Schokbeton Prods. Corp., 466 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1972); In re
Anne Cara Oil Co., Inc., 32 Bankr. 643 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983); In re LJP, Inc., 22 Bankr. 556
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); In re Benrus Watch Co., Inc., 13 Bankr. 331 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re
Beck, 5 Bankr. 169 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1980); In re Nashville White Trucks, Inc., 5 Bankr. 112
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980).
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that it can be assumed under section 365(a). 1 0 In re Nashville White
Trucks, Inc."" held that an executory contract may be assumed subject
to all of its provisions and conditions, one of which is the expiration
date.11 2 This result was necessary to prevent future parties from either
contracting for a shorter notice period to prevent the loss of a bar-
gained-for termination right by an intervening bankruptcy petition or
terminating the contract at the first sign of financial weakness.113 Thus,
termination clauses and expiration dates are an integral part of the
Contract and accompany the Contract when it is assumed.
The nondebtor still must be aware of the other party's financial
situation and anticipate a filing for bankruptcy to invoke a termination-
at-will clause. This clause begins a race between the debtor and credi-
tor.II If the creditor notifies the debtor of termination before the
debtor files a petition in bankruptcy, the creditor prevails. If the court
refuses to recognize the termination-at-will clause," 5 the effect will be
to compound the loss for the nondebtor and compound the gain for the
debtor. In the negotiation process the nondebtor may concede other
material terms in order to obtain the debtor's assent to the termination
clause. If the termination clause is not recognized, the nondebtor will
lose not only the bargained-for advantage of the clause, but also any
terms conceded to secure the clause's acceptance."" The debtor no
longer is subject to the termination clause and will enjoy the advantage
of any concessions given by the nondebtor for the termination clause's
acceptance. Thus, Reserve should have been aware that the termination
clause might not be recognized by the court and should not have con-
ceded much in negotiating for the clause's acceptance.
E. Assignment of the Executory Contract
If the Contract is not terminated pursuant to a termination clause,
PMI may wish to assume and assign the Contract to Knuckles & Asso-
ciates, a security service wishing to expand its operations by managing a
110. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
111. 5 Bankr. 112 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980).
112. Id. at 116.
113. Ruben, supra note 60, at 1047.
114. Id. at 1048.
115. The Code is silent about the effect of termination-at-will clauses. This silence has re-
sulted in conflicting decisions about enforcement of these provisions. Because section 365(e)(1)
does not automatically avoid this type of termination, some courts avoid a finding of termination
by relying on the broad equitable power granted by § 105(a), which provides that: "[t]he bank-
ruptcy court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry
out the provisions of this title." Id. at 1045 n.89.
116. Id. at 1054-55.
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correctional facility. 117 As a security service it is quite successful, but it
has never operated any type of correctional institution. The service,
however, feels confident that it can operate Reserve's corrections facili-
ties more efficiently than PMI. The general partners have studied cor-
rections operations and have developed a plan for operating the prisons
that was developed by combining several current systems. Assignment
could significantly increase the value of the bankruptcy estate because
Knuckles & Associates is willing to pay for the Contract.
This fifth issue, assignment of the Contract, raises a number of
questions: (1) whether Reserve can prevent the Contract's assignment
to Knuckles & Associates; (2) whether section 365 imposes any limita-
tions on PMI's general power to assign the Contract; and (3) if Reserve
negotiates and obtains a clause preventing or conditioning assignment,
whether the clause will be given effect when PMI subsequently files for
bankruptcy.
Subsection (f) lists the requirements that PMI must meet in order
to assign the Contract.1 " Assignment to a third party can occur only if
the Trustee is able to assume the Contract by satisfying the require-
ments of section 365(b)(1). Subsection (b)(1) imposes three require-
ments: the Trustee must (1) cure any defaults or provide adequate
assurance that the defaults will be promptly cured; (2) compensate Re-
serve for any actual pecuniary loss resulting from the default; and (3)
provide adequate assurance of future performance under the Con-
tract.119 These requirements, however, are not applicable in the case of
a default under an ipso facto clause. 2 '
The Code does not provide a statutory definition or standard for
what satisfies the requirement of "adequate assurance" in the context
of a contract. Adequate assurance is defined in section 365(b)(3) only
for the limited purposes of a shopping center lease.' 21 The special provi-
sions of this subsection, designed to protect the nondebtor party, are
operative when a trustee wishes to assign a lease. No default is required
to trigger the provisions.2  Subsection (b)(3) prescribes four conditions
117. PMI has no interest in a straight assumption of the Contract because of a Chapter 7
filing and can only realize a benefit to the bankruptcy estate if the Contract is assigned. Knuckles
& Associates is the firm that desires to purchase PMI's interest.
118. See generally supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text (discussing the operation of
subsection (f)).
119. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A)-(C) (Supp. 11 1985); see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying
text (discussing the operation of subsection (b)).
120. 2 COLLIER, supra note 28, 365.03, at 365-18. This is consistent with the invalidation of
ipso facto clauses in subsection (c).
121. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(3) (Supp. I1 1985).
122. Id. This subsection indicates two situations in which "adequate assurance" is triggered:
(1) under (b)(1) when there has been a default in the contract or lease, and (2) under (f)(2)(B)
when a shopping center lease is to be assigned. Id.
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that must be met to satisfy the requirement of adequate assurance. A
trustee must adequately assure the landlord that (1) the proposed as-
signee will be in a similar financial condition; (2) the percentage of rent
due will not substantially decline; (3) the assignment is subject to all
the provisions of the lease; and (4) the assignment will not disrupt the
tenant mix or balance in the shopping center.123 The standards supplied
for a shopping center lease provide a model for drafting similar contrac-
tual provisions in the privatization context. During the contract negoti-
ations, Reserve and PMI should have inserted a provision in the
Contract similar to the one in section 365(b)(3) that defines adequate
assurance. Such a provision would be enforceable because an assumed
contract is accompanied by all of its provisions and conditions and the
Contract must be assumed before it can be assigned.
124
Some contracts, however, are not assignable. Section 365(c)(1)"2 ' is
an exception to a trustee's general power granted in subsection (f)(1) to
assign executory contracts.1 26 Subsection (c)(1) originally was invoked
only for personal service contracts. 27 The court in In re Pioneer Ford,
Inc., however, held that the language of (c)(1) does not limit its effect to
personal service contracts but refers generally to contracts that are not
assignable under state law.128 In re Taylor Manufacturing, Inc.1 29 fol-
lowed this reasoning and applied the personal service limitation to a
contract to resolve the conflict between subsections (c)(1) and (f)(1).130
The goal behind subsection (f)(1) apparently is to allow the bankruptcy
court to disregard contractual provisions that specifically prohibit or
limit assignment, even though courts typically give effect to these
clauses. 3  Subsection (c)(1), nevertheless, refers to state laws that pro-
hibit assignment "whether or not" a contract refers to assignment.132
Subsection (c)(1) prohibits the assignment of a contract if "applica-
ble law" excuses the nondebtor party from rendering performance to
123. Id. § 365(b)(3)(A)-(D).
124. In re Nashville White Trucks, Inc., 5 Bankr. 112, 116 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980).
125. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
126. In re Pioneer Ford Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 27, 28 (1st Cir. 1984). As long as the require-
ments of (f)(2) are satisfied, subsection (f)(1) allows the executory contract to be assigned even if a
contractual provision or applicable law forbids assignment.
127. Id. at 28-29 (citing In re Taylor Mfg., Inc., 6 Bankr. 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980)).
128. Id. "State laws typically make contracts for personal services nonassignable . . .; but
they make other sorts of contracts nonassignable as well .... The legislative history of § 365(c)
says nothing about 'personal services.' To the contrary, it speaks of letters of credit, personal loans,
and leases .... The history thereby suggests that (c)(1)(A) has a broader reach." Id. at 29.
129. 6 Bankr. 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
130. Pioneer Ford Sales, 729 F.2d at 29.




another entity, unless the nondebtor party consents."3 Because "appli-
cable law" in this section means applicable nonbankruptcy law,1 34 this
subsection prevents assignment of contracts that contract law ordinarily
makes nonassignable. 135 Moreover, in subsection (c)(1) the clause,
"whether or not such contract. . . prohibits or restricts assignment,)13 6
prevents the use of contractual language to restrict the trustee's general
assignment powers when contract law allows assignment. 3 7 The focus is
on the state's general law concerning the type of contract and not on
the contractual provision limiting assignment. Thus, whether a bar-
gained-for nonassignability clause in a contract is enforceable depends
solely on nonbankruptcy law.138
Reserve and PMI should have determined during the negotiation
process whether nonbankruptcy law of the State of Reserve would per-
mit or prevent assignment to assess the value of a nonassignability
clause. If the assignment did occur, section 365(k)3 9 would relieve the
bankruptcy estate and the Trustee of any liability for a breach occur-
ring after the assignment.14 0 The possibility of an assignment is an im-
portant factor that should have influenced Reserve's initial decision to
privatize. The decision to privatize should focus not only on cost-effi-
ciency and benefits, but also on the actual amount of control that the
state is relinquishing and on who ultimately will likely be managing the
facilities.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
If a state decides to turn over the operation of its correctional facil-
ities to a private company, the contract should be drafted against the
background of all applicable laws, including bankruptcy laws. The
draftsmen of a contract should secure each party's rights in case litiga-
tion becomes necessary. The drafters should be aware of what laws will
govern the contract's validity and performance. The Code will dictate
the validity of some contractual provisions and may determine whether
a future relationship will exist between the parties. Knowledge of these
133. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
134. Pioneer Ford Sales, 729 F.2d at 28 (citing the legislative history of subsection (c)(1)).
135. Id. Nonbankruptcy law affects "contracts that cannot be assigned when the contract
itself is silent about assignment." Id.
136. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (Supp. III 1985).
137. Pioneer Ford Sales, 729 F.2d at 28.
138. The following are examples of nonbankruptcy laws that prevent assignment: N.Y. STATE
FIN. LAW § 138 (McKinney 1974) (making certain government contracts unassignable); N.Y. GEN.
MUN. LAW § 109 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 147-162 (1978). See also Pioneer Ford Sales,
729 F.2d at 29.
139. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
140. 11 U.S.C. § 365(k) (1982).
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potential consequences also should influence the negotiation process.
The draftsmen should incorporate several specific provisions into
the contract in order to preserve the rights of the state.141 First, the
contract should provide adequate assurance of future performance by
the trustee in assuming the contract according to the rules of section
365(b)(1)(C). The state, however, may include several burdensome con-
ditions precedent in the contract to deter the trustee from assuming the
contract.142 In spite of the difficulty of negotiating a nonassumable con-
tract, 43 the state might be able to bargain for a contract that renders
assumption so burdensome that assumption probably would not oc-
cur.1 " If the trustee offers adequate future assurances, the problems
associated with assumption and assignment would not arise. Likewise, if
the conditions precedent render the contract virtually unassumable, the
problems of assumption could be avoided.
A second possibility is the use of a termination-at-will clause that
provides for prepetition notice of termination. 4 5 Section 365(e)(1) has
been interpreted to apply only after bankruptcy has been filed.'46 Pro-
fessor Ruben suggests the following contractual provision for the state:
Licensor [the state] may terminate this agreement upon thirty days written notice
to licensee [the private company]. Licensee must inform licensor of its intention to
file a petition in bankruptcy at least five days prior to filing such a petition.
Debtor's filing without conforming to this requirement shall be deemed a material,
pre-petition incurable breach.1 47
This provision would provide the state five days within which to supply
the debtor with notice of the contract's termination; the intervening fil-
ing of bankruptcy would not stop the contract from terminating by its
own terms.'4 8 Although the state would discriminate against the debtor
solely on the basis of insolvency, that discrimination would occur pre-
petition. 49 Thus, a full understanding of the applicable law in addition
to careful drafting of the contract might allow a state to preserve its
termination right without departing from the provisions of the Code.
141. See generally Ruben, supra note 60.
142. Id. at 1058.
143. Too many other material terms in a contract might have to be conceded in order to get
a nonassumable contract signed. Id.
144. Id. The state, however, must prefer the contract not to be assumed for this suggestion to
be effective. If the party to the contract does want the contract assumed, then the contractual
provisions would set out what the party would consider to be fair and easily satisfiable require-
ments for adequate assurance.
145. Id.
146. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
147. Ruben, supra note 60, at 1058-59.
148. Id. at 1059; see supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.




The privatization of prisons is an appealing solution to the budget-
ary problems of many states. 150 Privatization has been practiced for
many years, but currently is being expanded to alleviate modern needs
and pressures. 151 However, although proposals to contract for adult cor-
rectional facilities may resolve some problems, these proposals raise a
number of additional political, administrative, and legal issues yet to be
resolved.
The primary political issue centers on the fact that the operation of
correctional facilities constitutes a powerful exercise of state power to
deprive persons in custody of the liberties all other citizens enjoy.' 52
The private company will be licensed to exercise the state's police
power, which is derived from the state's authority to administer disci-
pline and prevent escapes. The concern is whether this delegation is
proper. As a consequence of privatization, administrative issues also
arise involving the private company's quality of service, staff accounta-
bility, and contract monitoring.'53 Legal issues center both on the
state's statutory authority to contract with a private firm 54 and the
government's liability under the contract."5 One commentator states
that contracting out does not relieve the state of its potential liabilities,
but does remove the state's control over how these liabilities may
arise.156
In addition to the political, administrative, and legal issues in-
volved in privatization, other areas of the law govern the relationship
150. McEntee, supra note 16, at 43.
151. PRIVATIZATION OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 8, at 55. "The development of the juvenile
courts was marked by the birth of privately operated facilities for juveniles, a tradition which
extends to this day." Id.
152. Id. at 70.
The delegation of this authority to private providers raises issues not encountered in con-
tracting for more mundane services such as bus transportation or solid waste disposal. In a
facility entirely operated by the private sector, a range of management functions involving the
classification and control of inmates (including the use of deadly force) might be delegated to
the private contractor.
Id.
153. Id. at 74-76.
154. Id. at 76. The state authority may implicitly prohibit facility management or fail to
address the issue. Many states, however, do authorize service contracts, but this authorization will
not necessarily include the entire service function that is to be managed by a private company. Id.
155. Id. Because the management of private facilities is a relatively recent development, "no
body of case law has yet emerged to clarify the respective liabilities of public and private agencies.
There is, however, no legal principle to support the premise that public agencies will be able to
avoid or diminish their liability merely because services have been delegated to a private vendor."
Id.
156. Id. "[A] private contractor essentially acts as an extension of the state. Thus, if the
contractor errs, the state has retained its authority and may share the liability." Id. at 76-77.
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between the private company and the state. Under the bankruptcy law,
the power of the debtor to reject, assume, or assign an executory con-
tract allows for broad control by the debtor over the future relationship
of the parties. This general rule is subject to limitations, but the
debtor's power definitely far exceeds the protections provided to the
state. Moreover, key words in several provisions of section 365 lack stat-
utory definitions, which causes difficulty in interpreting this provision.
The courts have exacerbated the problem by supplying their own vary-
ing brand of statutory interpretation, creating confusion where Con-
gress intended clarity. Considering the number of unanswered issues
associated with privatization, a state should not privatize without
grasping the magnitude and complexity of these problems. These issues
should be addressed before privatization occurs, when sufficient time is
still available to consider alternative solutions.
Special interest legislation to amend the Code is a potential avenue
for resolving the bankruptcy issues in the privatization of corrections
facilities. For example, in response to NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,57
Congress enunciated through the Code the procedure and standard for
rejecting a collective bargaining agreement.""8 Although the drafting of
section 1113 is less than perfect, the provision announces a comprehen-
sive standard that covers the delicate concerns that collective bargain-
ing agreements often raise. Privatization represents a similarly delicate
issue that merits special attention by Congress before states adopt
large-scale privatization plans. Unfortunately, a privatization amend-
ment to the Code may not occur for some time. Thus, the privatization
157. 465 U.S. 513 (1984). The respondent filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition
for reorganization. Id. at 517. In 1979, prior to the filing of bankruptcy, the respondent negotiated
a three-year collective bargaining agreement with the union, expressly providing that operations
would continue if bankruptcy supervened. Id. at 518. In 1980 the respondent failed to meet some
of the obligations of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. After filing bankruptcy, the respon-
dent submitted a request to the bankruptcy court for permission to reject the collective bargaining
agreement under § 365(a) of the Code. Id. The Court considered collective bargaining agreements
to be executory contracts. Id. at 521-22. The major issue for the Court was what standard should
govern the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement under reorganization. The respondent
argued for the business judgment standard, but the Court concluded that a stricter standard was
needed, and noted the special nature of the contract and the law creating the agreement. Id. at
523. The Court held "that the Bankruptcy Court should permit rejection of a collective-bargaining
agreement under § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code if the debtor can show that the collective-
bargaining agreement burdens the estate, and that after careful scrutiny, the equities balance in
favor of rejecting the labor contract." Id. at 526.
158. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (Supp. III 1985).
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contract itself should anticipate the difficult issues that accompany
placing the traditionally public function of operating prisons into pri-
vate hands.
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